Airway to the East 1918-1920 and the collapse of No.1 Aerial Route RAF, Clive Semple

Airway to the East 1918-1920 and the collapse of No.1 Aerial Route RAF, Clive Semple


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Airway to the East 1918-1920 and the collapse of No.1 Aerial Route RAF, Clive Semple

Airway to the East 1918-1920 and the collapse of No.1 Aerial Route RAF, Clive Semple

In the aftermath of the end of the First World War the young RAF faced a fight to secure its long term future. One of the roles it attempted to fill was as Imperial policemen, and so when the Arab world began to protest about the post-war settlement, the RAF was filling to provide aircraft. The decision was made to fly the aircraft from France out to Egypt, in what would become the world's first long distance aerial route. The plan was to fly three squadrons of Handy Page O/400 heavy bombers across Europe and over the Mediterranean, using a line of airfields and with flying boat escorts on the sea stages.

The plan came at just the wrong moment. After the end of the fighting the RAF began to demobilise, and the men with the longest service and thus most experience were the first to go. By the summer of 1919, when the transfer began, the RAF was struggling to find skilled men to man the route. The experiences of flying aircraft from Britain to their bases in France should also have warned the RAF that the new route might be very costly.

In the event the route was a disaster. Eight men were killed, and about a third of the aircraft were lost on-route, some in accidents and some damaged by bad weather on the ground. The Handley Page O/400 was a fairly fragile aircraft, and most of the aircraft that did reach Egypt were considered to be too worn out for further flying.

The author's father actually took part in No.1 Aerial Route, and it was this family connection that first attracted the author to the topic. Despite this family connection the work is a well balanced account of the effort, and Semple is fair to the senior RAF men who decided to try and fly the aircraft to Egypt. His only minor foible is a tendency to latch onto every piece of evidence that the route had the official name of No.1 Aerial Route - it doesn't get mentioned in most histories of the RAF and a later Egypt to India route tends to be talked about as the first long range route.

This is an interesting study of the early days of long range aviation. Semple includes good material on an earlier flight to Egypt that encouraged the RAF to believe the aerial route was possible, and on the first flight from Britain to Australian, a more successful example of what could be achieved at the time.

Chapters
1 - Bad Landing at Centocelle
2 - The Army and the Navy Disagree
3 - Desert Revolt and the Allenby Campaign
4 - Borton's Pioneering Flight
5 - The End of the War with Turkey
6 - To India and Beyond
7 - The Arab World Erupts
8 - At the Air Ministry
9 - 'Won't it be Fun if We Come Down Here!'
10 - Disaster over Mont St. Victoire
11 - 'All my Staff are Anxious to Get Demobbed'
12 - 'It Has Been a Complete Failure'
13 - The Court of Enquiry
14 - The Aftermath
15 - England to Australia - the Competition
16 - The Race - Winners and Losers

Author: Clive Semple
Edition: Hardcover
Pages: 244
Publisher: Pen & Sword Aviation
Year: 2012



Airway to the East 1918-1920

Like Pen & Sword’s autobiography of Hitler’s snapper, this is the sort of book that inspires articles in the nether regions of the Daily Mail. Clever PR can do wonders for a book, so perhaps I missed any press coverage with all this Olympics stuff going on?

Clive Semple has pulled off a small magic trick to tease out what might be a lost fact about the early RAF when an aerial route was set up linking Britain with Egypt to transport aircraft to what was a strategic hub of the Empire. It was the time just after the Great War and the Balfour Declaration when some Brits were busy reneging on promises fellow countrymen had made to the Arabs. Yet more Brits, deeply uncomfortable with the whole thing stood powerless while their country and France carved up the old Ottoman empire as the seeds of so many of that region’s ills took root. Add this tragedy to the penny pinching shenanigans of post war British defence policy sprinkle on a fiasco, add some truly epic heroics and bring gently to the boil!

This is the recipe for a really great story, but in this book you actually get several for your money.

The fledgling RAF was a strong candidate for infanticide at the hands of rival services, the Treasury and other malignant forces. Proving itself and doing things well were so important. But, as always, rivalries, indifference, incompetence and chunks of misfortune were all on hand to mess this particular episode up. The sequence of events is told well at a good pace with plenty of colour. I like the detail and the imagery. It is difficult not to agree with many of the conclusions.

What I didn’t enjoy were needless swipes at Douglas Haig and other references to British leadership which seem to be there to ingratiate the project to an Australian readership. The book continues the tired old myth that only Anzacs fought and died at Gallipoli in the Allied cause. Bad British generalship in the Dardanelles did not just kill Aussies and citing the behaviour of Ian Hamilton is pointless because his failure has long been cast as epic in both hemispheres.

The book can fairly be seen as sympathetic to the Arabs and I’ll be honest and say I agree with this stance. There is no anti-Semitism and nor should there be, because it is irrelevant to the story. The author saves much of his ire for Hugh Trenchard, and however relevant this is to the saga of the Aerial Route, I don’t agree with his assessment of his attitude to heavy bombers as a weapon when he is recognised as an advocate of strategic bombing and can hardly be cast as being against it! The fact is Trenchard had a bruising relationship with Northcliffe and Rothermere (who hated his mentor Haig) during the war and, having resigned as Chief of the Air Staff he baulked at becoming head of the Independent Air Force which was to carry out air raids on Germany. His negativity was directed at the role offered him, not at what the force was doing. Does this stuff spoil the book? Well, yes, it does a bit. But, there is so much more to the package, so let’s move on.

The book concludes with the truly epic tale of the England to Australia air race won by Ross and Keith Smith. It is an amazing story in itself and does the book great credit by its inclusion because it all fits together so well. The witness to all these events was the author’s father, Leslie Semple, a RAF officer who met several of the protagonists, wrote interesting letters and took excellent photographs. He is to be treasured.

The colourful characters who surveyed the air route, Biffy Barton and Ross Smith were giants. Smith and his brother Keith achieved immortality when they flew from Hounslow to Darwin in a Vickers Vimy at the behest of the showboating Australian PM Billy Hughes for a whopping prize of £10,000. It really was a case of advance Australia fair and no sane person would deny them or their mechanics Bennett and Shiers their place in the pantheon of great aviators. The author is correct to point out how sad it is that Biffy Barton, the Englishman who did so much for the enterprise has been largely lost to history. Bring him back.

So, all in all, this is a great read about little known events mixed in with better known history. I love the chutzpah of the author and can see why he has such pride in his father who was there to play more than just a walk on part in this most fascinating tale.

If you are interested in the early history of the Royal Air Force you cannot ignore this book even if some of the conclusions do not meet your expectations. It has a lot going for it and it will make you want to learn more, which is always a good thing, isn’t it?

Mark Barnes

AIRWAY TO THE EAST 1918-1920 and the Collapse of No1 Aerial Route RAF.
By Clive Semple.
Published in hardback by Pen & Sword Aviation £19.99.
ISBN: 978 1 84884 657 9


Airway to the East 1918-1920 and the collapse of No.1 Aerial Route RAF, Clive Semple - History

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Airway to the East 1918-1920, has been written and compiled using photographs and a diary, discovered by Clive Semple, in his father&rsquos attic after his death in 1971. Once he retired in 1996, he set to work researching the background to his father&rsquos collection. The diary and two of the albums were the basis of Clive&rsquos first book, Diary of a Night Bomber Pilot in WW1 which was published in 2008.

The third album and, most importantly the scrap book, provided the starting point for research into a sorry tale of RAF mismanagement which is revealed in this book. The Balfour Declaration in 1917, promised the Jews a homeland in Palestine. This contradicted a previous promise which Britain had made to the Arabs guaranteeing them independence if they helped drive the Turks out of Palestine and Syria. The Turks were duly driven out. When the Arabs discovered that they had been swindled they revolted and the British Army was unable to contain the unrest. It was decided to reinforce the Army with a fleet of bombers and fifty-one set off from England and France to fly to Cairo in the summer of 1919. Seventeen crashed or were otherwise destroyed en route and eight airmen were killed. The story got into the newspapers and Parliament demanded a Court of Enquiry. The evidence of mismanagement looked so bad, that before the enquiry began, Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, decided to hold it behind closed doors at the Air Ministry. The enquiries findings were suppressed by the Secretary of State for Air, Winston Churchill and the newspapers never followed up the story. Fortunately the enquiry proceedings were filed away at the Air Ministry and it was a newspaper cutting which Clive found in his father&rsquos scrap book dealing with the row in Parliament, that led him to search through the Air Ministry files and uncover this account.

Most histories of the RAF are written by retired senior RAF officers who have all avoided including this event in their written works.

A recounting of the failed attempt to develop a quicker way to move military aircraft to the Middle East theater of operations.

WWI Historical Association

The author had patently done a great deal of research during the preparation of this book, as shown by the endnotes for each chapter and the bibliography. It is illustrated by a large number of photographs, some in colour to highlight maps used and many new to me, and provides a really good insight into an episode in aviation history that had hitherto received much less attention that it deserves. Well worth a read.

Cross & Cockade International Spring 2013

Pen & Sword’s new book on the Middle Eastern air route established shortly after the First World War is a rare gem that tackles a topic that is virtually unique in its field.
Author Clive Semple spares no on in this tell-all work. Aside from being an excellent explanation of the beginnings of the Middle East mess as we know it today, Semple reveals how the British betrayal of the Arabs after WW1 was met with armed resistance. Aside from its amazing content, Airway to the East is perfectly suited for convenient reading. The page stock is of unusually high quality and the photos are plentiful and spread throughout the text rather than stuffed into a photo section.
This is more than a story of war. It is a story of intrigue, corruption, and a compelling testament to the adage that the first casualty in any war is the truth.
This book is affordable, handy in size, easily read, and highly recommended.

Indy Squadron Dispatch

On 25th July 1918, Brigadier “Biffy’ Borton and crew took off from Cranwell in Handley Page O/400 C9681, landing eleven days later at Heliopolis after 2,592 miles. The Air Ministry nominated this course as No. 1 Aerial Route.
The political chaos in the Middle East after the Turks were expelled resulted in the British Government deciding to send more HPs plus some Vimys and 51 followed down the route. But 17 did not make it and eight crew members were killed.
The author’s father kept a scrapbook which is the basis of this book. There was an enquiry into the operations of the route. This book details the political problems involved the post-war Middle East and the RAF’s problems.

Aeromilitaria – Autumn 2012

Clive Semple has pulled off a small magic trick to tease out what might be a lost fact about the early RAF when an aerial route was set up linking Britain with Egypt to transport aircraft to what was a strategic hub of the Empire.
This is the recipe for a really great story, but in this book you actually get several for your money.
The sequence of events is told well at a good pave with plenty of colour. I like the detail and the imagery. It is difficult not to agree with many of the conclusions.
So, all in all, this is a great read about little known events mixed in with better known history.

War History Online

The author has not only covered the RAF failure and cover up, but also shown how the initial work of developing a network of airfields was to be exploited by civil crews racing each other from Britain to Australia in similar large British WW1 strategic bombers. There is a colour plate section in the book, but most illustrations are in b&w images embedded in the text to produce a lavishly illustrated work that displays some very rare photographs, most of which have not appeared before. This is an absorbing and rewarding book that exposes scandal and gives a much needed airing of the innovative work by British Naval Aviators that could have been much better employed by the young RAF.

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Airway to the East 1918-1920 and the collapse of No.1 Aerial Route RAF, Clive Semple - History

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Overview

The origins of what became officially known as No 1 Aerial Route lay in the newly formed Royal Air Force&rsquos desire to move several squadrons of the then recently designed first heavy bomber to enter service &ndash the Handley Page O/400, to the war in the Middle-East. The aircraft had served on the Western Front with some success, although not in the long-range capacity. During the spring of 1918, the Wing Commander of No 5 Wing, &lsquoBilly&rsquo Borton, requested that one of the HP O/400 aircraft be flown to Egypt. This was approved by Major General Sir Frederick Sykes. Before the flight could proceed a great deal of planning was required since the aircraft&rsquos maximum range was only 600 miles. Several refueling and maintenance bases along the route were required. When planned in 1918 the route was from Paris &ndash Lyons, Istres, Pisa, Rome, Barletta, Taranto, Athens, Crete, Mersa Matru and finally Cairo. Each landing station would require fuel, spares, and communications and back-up personnel. On July 50.00 1918 a new HPO/400 set off from Manston in Kent with Borton and his pilot Major McLaren plus two crew. After a comparatively trouble-free flight the bomber arrived in Aboukir, Alexandria on the evening of 7 August.
As a result, the RAF decided to use this route to fly several squadrons of the Handley Page bombers shortly after the war had ended. The Arab leaders had found out that the Allie&rsquos promise that the captured Turkish lands would be returned to them was a duplicitous lie and that France and Great Britain would take control of the area. This quite naturally lead to massive unrest and rioting throughout the middle-eastern lands. The bombers were needed to quell the rioting and sabotage that had broken out. Thus, on 3 May 1919 58 Squadron set of from France on No 1 Aerial Route. It was a premature departure since many of the refueling airfields along the route were not prepared for there incoming customers. Chaos ensued &ndash by 1 November Three Squadrons had been dispatched. Of the 51 bombers sent only 26 had arrived, ten were stuck en-route and 15 had been written-off as broken or lost at sea and 11 aircrew had perished.
This is the story of the development of the route. It would eventually form the first stage of the Imperial Air Route to Australia.


Martin Rose

A year or so ago I was very struck by an account of the way aeroplanes navigated across the desert between ‘Amman and Baghdad in the 1920s. There was a furrow ploughed into the land surface all the way, and the pilot simply followed it. This struck me as quite funny, an unexpectedly primitive way to navigate, and I was reminded of a wonderful story told by the Police Attaché to the embassy meeting in a European country that had better remain nameless, of drug smugglers in a light aircraft desperately following the motorway system, road atlas in hand, while a cavalcade of police cars roared along the tarmac below like Keystone Cops, keeping up with the plane. But in fact, I simply didn’t know much about the early days of flight.

Recently I came across an interesting book called Airway to the East,[1] which deals with the very first attempts to set up an air route from London to Cairo, in 1919. The idea was simple enough. It was planned as a way of shuttling quite large numbers of Handley Page bombers, redundant on the Western Front after the Armistice, out to the Middle East where they were needed for action against the Arabs, who were unaccountably reluctant to fall in with Anglo-French plans for the future of the region. Bombing them seemed like a good idea (indeed Churchill, famously, went further: “I do not understand the squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poisonous gas against uncivilised tribes”) and planes were needed. The Handley Page O/100 was a monster, which when it first rolled out of the factory in late 1915 weighed twice as much as any aeroplane ever built, had a wingspan of 100 feet and a range of 400 miles. So wide was it that the telegraph poles in Colindale Avenue had to be sawn down for the prototype to reach Hendon aerodrome. Two years later a more powerful model, the O/400, could carry 2,000 lbs of bombs as against its predecessor’s 600 lbs. These were the machines that were destined for the Middle East

Aerial warfare was devastatingly effective against Turkish ground forces (and later, Arabs). A decisive attack on a Turkish column at Wadi al Fara’a by the RAF in September 1918 resulted in what the wonderfully named, if also wonderfully unattractive, Colonel ‘Biffy’ Borton described thus: “We bombed [them] incessantly for four hours, completely blocking the head of the column and creating the most appalling carnage. A length of road some five miles long was absolutely packed and you can get some idea of what it meant from the subsequent count – over 80 guns and 700 horses and motor transport were found in an inextricable mess on just this one stretch of road.” It is about as edifying as the American ‘turkey-shoot’ on the Mutla Ridge above Kuwait in 1991: overwhelming air superiority used to obliterate retreating infantrymen. Interesting that Biffy didn’t bother to enumerate the dead Turks, as he did the horses.

But the aeroplanes were very fragile. Made of flimsy doped cloth stretched over wooden frames, with propellers prone to warping and splitting in the heat and rubber petrol-tubes that disintegrated in sunlight, they had a short life-span at the best of times, and then only with very regular maintenance. The cloth peeled and split and needed constant repair. The whole machine had to be pegged down meticulously at night so as not to blow away. In the Mediterranean they suffered a terrible rate of attrition from natural forces. The HP’s wings were too heavy to support themselves, so they had to be kept up by wire rigging – and it was the business of the myriad riggers to re-rig – to check, tighten and replace the rigging wires – each day. On top of this, all controls were operated by physical wire-pulls which easily jammed, especially when thickened and roughened by rust which made them stick in their pulleys with disastrous results. With a theoretical range of 400 miles, the O/400 often managed only 200 into a headwind and sometimes much less (one flight into a strong headwind is recorded with an overland speed of 10 mph).

This meant that to get to Cairo, their destination, they had to be flown down a designated route with a great many landing fields for overnight stops and servicing and a great many emergency fields for pilots caught short by a headwind or engine failure – or simply by getting lost. The route changed all the time, but a 1918 plan shows a start at Buc (outside Paris) and overnight stops at Lyons, Istres, Pisa, Rome, Barletta, Taranto, Athens, Suda Bay, and Mersa Matruh – which is to say an optimal ten days to Cairo, almost never achieved. The trans-Mediterranean leg, from Suda Bay to Mersa, was about 250 miles over water, and aeroplanes were supposed to be escorted by destroyers or sea-planes (“it had been discovered that there was no ferry service between North Africa and Crete”). It very seldom happened quite that way, and indeed “the escorting flying-boats were mostly mythical, and even when they did appear, could not carry passengers on the first half of the crossing because of the large amount of petrol they had to carry at take-off.” This would have rendered their ability to carry passengers on the second half of the crossing somewhat superfluous.

In fact the whole functioning of No. 1 Aerial Route RAF was an unmitigated disaster. It was badly planned, badly managed, and undermanned by officers and men whose main preoccupation was being demobilised. The crew on the landing strips were idle and often absent the pilots were prone to taking time off to see the sights the spare parts were never where they were needed the escorts were almost always unavailable the chain of command was incompetent the availability of weather forecasts and wirelesses pathetic maps were inadequate there was no petty cash or expenses. So disastrous was the whole doomed enterprise that the very existence of No 1 Aerial Route was afterwards routinely denied by the RAF and the Air Ministry, and only dug out of the archives by the author of this book, whose father, stationed at Suda Bay in Crete, had kept press cuttings and photograph albums.

The story told in this book, though it’s much too heavy on technical detail for anyone but a terminal aviation history buff to savour in full, would be very funny were it not for the young lives lost in crash after crash along the Route. “They changed propellers at Suda but the replacements, which were cannibalised from Liberty flying boats, had brass tips and were twelve inches too small in diameter. This meant they could not fly higher than 2,000 feet and had to fly round the west end [of Crete] to avoid the mountains” – “During the night a gale blew up and the plane was blown from its moorings. A sister machine was also blown on top of the petrol shed” – “One machine made a forced landing on the Greek coast at Amyro because it had run out of petrol. It was impossible to get petrol to it by lorry and so HMS Swallow was sent from Alexandria” – “D5418 came in to land at Pisa, but when only 400 feet from the ground, the elevators jammed and the machine crashed on its nose on the airfield” – “One engine ran out of oil and seized and they found the plane was unable to maintain height on one engine alone … the machine came down in a gentle glide on to the sea and the pilot, concentrating on the landing, forgot to undo his safety harness … the machine tipped up on its nose … and the pilot went under water with the cockpit” – “At Athens they were delayed for ten hours because the petrol supplied contained water and they had to empty all the tanks and strain the petrol through chamois leather” – “One of the replacement machines never even started the journey before it was wrecked. A gale blew up at Buc, outside Paris … and while the machine was being hurriedly wheeled into a hangar, the tail was blown off the skid trolley and the fuselage cracked” – “HP J2246 had five forced landings while it was crossing France … the pilot got lost and came down in the sea at St Aygulf.”

At the end of September 1919, the situation could be summarised thus: “twenty-nine machines were either in Egypt or more or less airworthy en route, and thirteen had been written off. That still left nine machines dotted about …” It constituted a 30 percent failure rate, and eleven deaths. The accidents alone had cost £110,000. The whole story was the subject of an RAF inquiry which was carefully manipulated by the high command resonsible in order to bury the scale of the disaster. The patronising, self-assured and self-protective incompetence with which very senior officers handled money, young lives and the truth is still shocking a century later.

One final aspect of all this that I found very revealing was the attitude of the aircrew to the Arabs. The author comments drily that “Each of the crew had been issued with a side-arm in case the machine made a forced landing along the coast of North Africa where the native Senussi tribesmen were hostile because they were in the pay of the Turks. Orders then were to destroy the aircraft and then shoot oneself before unspeakable things were perpetrated by the locals. Unsurprisingly the crews chose the northern Mediterranean route (via Crete) rather than the African one (via Malta).” Unsurprising indeed, though it suggests a slightly unexpected coyness from RAF aircrew (Biggles would have used the revolver to fight his way out: Biffy apparently not.) But much more unspeakable is this episode, in the course of Major Stuart McLaren’s flight to Delhi in a Handley Page in 1919, recorded by the insouciant pilot:

Soon after leaving Bandar Rig we had a little amusement at the expense of one of the natives of the country. We were flying at about 100 feet when we saw, a short distance ahead, an unlucky native who was attempting to bathe by the banks of a small stream and was consequentially not in a position to argue his point with us. We put the nose of the machine down and headed straight for this unhappy mortal, who, already petrified with fear, at once threw up his arms to Allah and called loudly for help. At a distance of 50 yards I fired a green Verey’s light at him which burst into flames in front of his feet. His morale became extremely disorganised and he fell flat on his face into the stream.

Well, in fact, of course it was McLaren’s morale – or at least his morals – that were extremely disorganised, and this little vignette tells us a great deal about the sheer, bloody arrogance of imperial power. And now the natives of the country are bringing down European aeroplanes with their own amusing explosions. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

[1] Clive Semple, Airway to the East 1918-1920 and the Collapse of No. 1 Aerial Route RAF, Barnsley 2012.


Kenley to Cairo - Lawrence of Arabia and the Forgotten Record Breakers

One of the Wing’s most challenging flights commenced on 21st June, 1919, when two Canadian Flight Lieutenant’s from No.1 (Communications) Squadron set off to deliver a diplomat to the Middle East, narrowly avoiding disaster along the way and gaining a charismatic passenger, Colonel T. E. Lawrence – later known as “Lawrence of Arabia.”

A British Betrayal..

In 1917, the Balfour Declaration promised the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine, contradicting an earlier promise to the Arabs which guaranteed them independence if they helped the British drive the Ottoman Turks out of Palestine and Syria. Having stuck to their side of the bargain and driven out the Turks, the Arabs were incensed by this betrayal and the British Army were unable to quell the ensuing unrest.

To support the British Army, the RAF were tasked with setting up an aerial route from London to Cairo in order to send a fleet of Handley Page bombers to the Middle East. The precedent for this ambitious endeavour had been set by the record-breaking flight of RAF Major A.S.C. MacLaren and Brigadier Borton, in the Summer of 1918. After considerable preparations had been made, they “hopped” from London to Cairo in fifteen and a half days without a great deal of incident.

Setting up a regular London to Cairo ferry route, however, required mechanics, spares, fuel, ferry pilots and suitable airstrips along the way, a considerable logistical challenge, but the idea was received enthusiastically by many in the high command of the RAF and Air Ministry. However, Major General E. H. Ellington, The Comptroller of Equipment, RAF, who had experience of ferrying aircraft over the much shorter distance from England’s Air Acceptance Parks to the Western Front, considered that the scheme had nothing to commend it. Nevertheless, MacLaren’s idea was set in motion.

In the Summer of 1919, fifty-one bombers set off from England and France for Cairo, along ‘No.1 Aerial Route RAF.’ Of those, seventeen crashed or were destroyed and eight airmen were killed. When the story broke in the British press a Court of Enquiry was ordered, but the whole episode was such a fiasco that Hugh Trenchard, Chief of Air Staff, held the enquiry behind closed doors and Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for Air, suppressed the findings.

A Secret Mission.

One of the aircraft trying to follow this perilous route from London to Cairo was carrying a VIP passenger – Harry St. John Philby, (Father of the spy, Kim Philby), an India Office diplomat whose presence was urgently required to mediate between territorial rivals Sherif Hussein and Ibn Saud.

The crew comprised two Canadian Lieutenants, Harry Alexander Yates and Jimmy D. Vance, along with mechanics Stedman and Hand. They would be flying down the route at the same time as the rest of the bombers but, as time was of the essence, they decided to attempt to reach their destination in three days, smashing Borton and MacLaren’s record of the previous summer.

The Man for the Job.

In June 1919, Harry Yates was celebrating the success of his recent record-breaking multi-engine flight from London to Paris. He had shown promise as a pilot from the beginning of his flying training and had served as a bomber pilot for the RAF during the Great War. It’s easy to see why he was chosen to get Philby to Cairo in record time – after all, he had trained MacLaren to handle the giant Handley Page bombers without ever knowing the exact nature of MacLaren’s mission, and probably wondered why he wasn’t given the chance to attempt it himself. On a personal level, Yates had no time to lose. He had been suffering from chronic stomach pain which had become so severe that it had necessitated surgery to remove half his stomach – the prognosis was that he only had six months to live.

The Adventure Begins..

Yates and Vance had been given a brand new Handley Page 0/400, (HP F318). These Great War giants were roughly the same size as the American Flying Fortresses of WW2 and could carry 23 people or more than a ton of bombs, but despite their size and weight, their canvas covered wings made them quite fragile.

It is unclear whether Yates and Vance left Kenley on the 20th June, flying down to Lympne and leaving there at dawn the following day, or whether they set off from Kenley on the 21st. Either way, they made a good start and arrived in Paris that afternoon.

Their problems began the following day when the ground support, promised by the Air Ministry, failed to appear at Lyon and they had to refuel the bomber themselves. Despite this, they decided to push on to Marseille the same day, where they found the landing strip strewn with boulders, which blew out two tyres. During a lunch break, their maps were stolen. In an age before radio, radar or direction-finding beams, this was catastrophic. However, the crew obtained a local encyclopaedia, traced the maps they required, mended the tyres and refuelled again, continuing on to Pisa the same day.

Remarkably, the following day they reached Taranto, having stopped briefly in Rome and crossed the hazardous mountains of Italy’s ‘boot’ successfully.

On day four, the aim was to reach Suda Bay in Crete, but when their starboard petrol pump failed, Yates and Vance decided to try for Athens. They didn’t make it and had to attempt a forced landing in a partially dry river-bed beside the Gulf of Corinth. The landing was so perilous that the two pilots shook hands before attempting it, but they managed to bring the 0/400 in with only a punctured tyre and damaged tail skid. They transferred fuel from the fuselage tank to the starboard wing tank and helpful locals lifted the tail of the aircraft, so that repairs to the tail skid could be carried out. A strip was cleared of boulders for take-off and they were soon back on course for Athens with the mechanics hand-pumping fuel the entire way.

The next setback occurred when it was realised that the fuel supplied at Athens contained water. This led to a ten hour delay, while it was syphoned off and filtered through chamois leather.

On day five, the 25th June, the intrepid aviators left for Crete, still hand-pumping fuel, but worse was yet to come. They were airborne when their port propellor split causing a violent vibration – now flying on only one engine, an exhausted Yates struggled to maintain enough height and only just managed to avoid ripping off a wing on the approach to Suda Bay, where the landing strip was in an extinct volcano.

No advance arrangements had been made with the seaplane base at Suda, and the airmen were left to themselves to sort out food, accommodation and the necessary repairs to the Handley Page 0/400. Their propellor was unrepairable, so Yates cannibalised one from another aircraft, and set about repairs.

“Lawrence of Arabia”

Meanwhile, Philby had run into Colonel T. E. Lawrence, who was stranded at Suda having “hitched a ride” from Paris with another H.P. 0/400 that had crashed at Centocelle, near Rome on 17th May, killing it’s two pilots.

Lawrence had been attending the Paris Peace Conference as Prince Feisal’s representative, but had become so disillusioned with the Machiavellian actions of the British and French governments, that he had walked out. He made for Cairo, to pick up documents from the Arab Bureau which he needed to complete his account of the Arab revolt against the Turks, (later published as “The Seven Pillars of Wisdom”).

When the 0/400 had crashed at Centocelle, Lawrence had been in the rear gunner’s cockpit, and escaped with concussion, a broken collar bone and bruised ribs. Having recovered in hospital, Lawrence resumed his journey, “hitch-hiking” with the fleet of bombers heading down to Cairo, and arrived at Suda Bay on the 15th June.

Effectively stranded until a serviceable machine began the onward journey, Lawrence amused himself by visiting Knossos to see the remains of the Minoan civilisation, but had returned to Suda by the 29th June, when Yates and Vance were ready to continue their journey, now with Lawrence as well as Philby on board.

As they were making final preparations to depart, a “signal” arrived from the Senior Naval Officer at the seaplane base, asking why the arrival of the bomber had not been reported. Colonel Lawrence was now the senior officer in the Handley Page party, and sent back a reply asking the Naval Officer where he had been hiding. The senior RAF officer (Henderson, C.O. of No.58 squadron) suggested that an apology might be more appropriate, but Lawrence was having none of it!

Cairo at Last…

Nine Handley Page 0/400’s finally left Suda Bay on 29th June, but when the flying boat escorting them failed to become airborne, all but two turned back. Yates and Vance were one of crews that continued out over the Mediterranean to Libya, though all on board realised how perilous this might be without a flying boat on hand. They didn’t even carry life-jackets or a dinghy. Prior to this, only three aircraft had succeeded in making the crossing, now the RAF were attempting to get fifty across!

The situation looked grim when, yet again, a fuel pump failed, but by mid afternoon they had arrived over the deserts of North Africa. After re-fuelling, the determined crew pressed on to Cairo, still pumping fuel by hand, but couldn’t find the airport! Yates was blinded by the evening lights of Cairo and Lawrence stepped-in to save the day by crawling out onto the wing to get a better view!

Record-Breakers!

The battered bomber and her weary crew finally touched down in Cairo on the night of the 26th June. Although they hadn’t achieved their aim of delivering Philby in three days, they had shattered MacLaren and Borton’s record of 15 1/2 days – making the epic journey in five days, although only 36 hours of that had been spent in the air!

Philby and Lawrence were last seen by Captain Hendersen heading in to the Shepheard’s Hotel Cairo, an elite establishment that only welcomed guests from the officer class. They were both anti-Zionist, and disillusioned with British Foreign policy.

The flight was an outstanding achievement, but Yates and his crew were prevented from speaking to journalists in Cairo because of the “political sensitivity of their mission.” The pilots returned to their base in England, only to find that their Squadron Leader had listed them as having been killed in a crash at Marseilles – news which had even been reported in the Daily Mail! Although they were nominated for the Air Force Cross, Yates and Vance weren’t recognised for their outstanding achievement because of their status as ‘colonials’. They returned to Canada in late 1919.

Justice was done when Harry Yates and Jimmy Vance were finally awarded the Air Force Cross after the Canadian Prime Minister, Robert Borden, interceded on their behalf, arguing that their treatment by the RAF was unjust.


Airway to the East 1918-1920 and the collapse of No.1 Aerial Route RAF, Clive Semple - History

The origins of what became officially known as No 1 Aerial Route lay in the newly formed Royal Air Force&rsquos desire to move several squadrons of the then recently designed first heavy bomber to enter service &ndash the Handley Page O/400, to the war in the Middle-East. The aircraft had served on the Western Front with some success, although not in the long-range capacity. During the spring of 1918, the Wing Commander of No 5 Wing, &lsquoBilly&rsquo Borton, requested that one of the HP O/400 aircraft be flown to Egypt. This was approved by Major General Sir Frederick Sykes. Before the flight could proceed a great deal of planning was required since the aircraft&rsquos maximum range was only 600 miles. Several refueling and maintenance bases along the route were required. When planned in 1918 the route was from Paris &ndash Lyons, Istres, Pisa, Rome, Barletta, Taranto, Athens, Crete, Mersa Matru and finally Cairo. Each landing station would require fuel, spares, and communications and back-up personnel. On July 50.00 1918 a new HPO/400 set off from Manston in Kent with Borton and his pilot Major McLaren plus two crew. After a comparatively trouble-free flight the bomber arrived in Aboukir, Alexandria on the evening of 7 August.

As a result, the RAF decided to use this route to fly several squadrons of the Handley Page bombers shortly after the war had ended. The Arab leaders had found out that the Allie&rsquos promise that the captured Turkish lands would be returned to them was a duplicitous lie and that France and Great Britain would take control of the area. This quite naturally lead to massive unrest and rioting throughout the middle-eastern lands. The bombers were needed to quell the rioting and sabotage that had broken out. Thus, on 3 May 1919 58 Squadron set of from France on No 1 Aerial Route. It was a premature departure since many of the refueling airfields along the route were not prepared for there incoming customers. Chaos ensued &ndash by 1 November Three Squadrons had been dispatched. Of the 51 bombers sent only 26 had arrived, ten were stuck en-route and 15 had been written-off as broken or lost at sea and 11 aircrew had perished.

This is the story of the development of the route. It would eventually form the first stage of the Imperial Air Route to Australia.

About The Author

Clive Semple is the son of Leslie George Semple an RAF Officer who worked on the route. He has used his father’s diary, scrapbook and photograph albums as the starting point for his lengthy researches.

REVIEWS

"A recounting of the failed attempt to develop a quicker way to move military aircraft to the Middle East theater of operations."

- WWI Historical Foundation

I. Sites Explored

1 Work by Headland Archaeology Ltd. P. Masser, Green Hill Primary School, Gelligaer, Caerphilly: Archaeological Evaluation, HAS845 (2009). Mr A. Boucher sent information.

2 Work by Dyfed Archaeological Trust (DAT report No. 2010/13). Mr K. Murphy sent information.

3 Partially excavated in 1961 Jarrett , M.G. , ‘ Excavations at Llys Brychan, Llangadog, 1961 ’, Carmarthenshire Antiquary 4 ( 1962 ), 2 – 8 .Google Scholar

4 Work by the Dyfed Archaeological Trust and local volunteers as part of the Exploration Tywi! community landscape investigation project, funded by the Tywi Afon yr Oesoedd Landscape partnership scheme. Mr K. Murphy sent information.

5 Ashby , T. , ‘ Excavations at Caerwent, Monmouthshire, on the site of the Romano-British city of Venta Silurum, in the year 1905 ’, Archaeologia 60 ( 1906 ), 111 –30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Work by S. Clarke and J. Bray for Monmouth Archaeology, during the groundworks for the construction of an extension. Mr S. Clarke sent information.

7 Work by Monmouth Archaeological Society during digging of service trenches. Mr S. Clarke sent information.

8 Watching-brief by S. Clarke and J. Bray for Monmouth Archaeology, during the construction of an extension. Mr S. Clarke sent information.

9 Work by M. Brett and M. Collard for Cotswold Archaeology. Mr N. Holbrook sent information.

10 Remains of a similar building approximately 25 m to the north has previously been recorded, see Britannia 38 (2007), 249.

11 Work by S. Clarke and J. Bray for Monmouth Archaeology, during the groundworks connected with the construction of a house. Mr S. Clarke sent information.

12 Work by Cotswold Archaeology during groundworks for a new Performing Arts Centre. Information via Archaeology in Wales.

13 Work by S. Clarke and J. Bray for Monmouth Archaeology. Mr S. Clarke sent information.

14 Work by S.H. Sell for Glamorgan-Gwent Archaeological Trust, during trial pitting in advance of a new drainage scheme. Dr E.M. Evans sent information.

15 See Britannia 39 (2008), 267–8.

16 Brewer , R.J. , ‘ Caerleon and the archaeologists: changing ideas on the Roman fortress ’, The Monmouthshire Antiquary 17 ( 2001 ), 25 .Google Scholar

17 Work by staff and undergraduates from Cardiff University directed by Dr T. Young and Dr A. Lane. Dr P. Guest sent information.

18 Work directed by M. Tuck for the Glamorgan-Gwent Archaeological Trust, in connection with the construction of a coach park for the Ryder Cup. Dr E.M. Evans sent information.

19 See Britannia 28 (1997), 404.

20 Work by Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust in advance of a new water main. Mr N. Jones sent information.

21 Silvester , R.J. , ‘ Abertanat, Llansantffraid and Clawdd Coch: Barri Jones’s excavations in Montgomeryshire ’, Studia Celtica 42 ( 2008 ), 27 – 53 .Google Scholar

22 Work by Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust in advance of a new water main. Mr N. Jones sent information.

23 Work by Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust, in advance of a supermarket development. Mr N. Jones sent information.

24 Work by Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust in advance of a new water main. Mr N. Jones sent information.

25 Trial excavations investigating a potential cursus by Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust. Mr N. Jones sent information.

26 Thomas , H.J. , ‘ Iolo Morgannwg vindicated: Glamorgan’s first field archaeologist ’, GGAT Annual Report 1983–84 ( 1985 ), 149 –57.Google Scholar

27 Work co-ordinated by Entec UK, in advance of the redevelopment of MoD St Athan. Entec UK Ltd, Defence Training College and Aerospace Business Park – St Athan: Environmental Statement (2009).

28 Work co-ordinated by Entec UK, in advance of the redevelopment of MoD St Athan. Entec UK Ltd, Defence Training College and Aerospace Business Park – St Athan: Environmental Statement (2009).

29 Barber , A. Cox , S. and Hancocks , A. , ‘ A Late Iron Age and Roman farmstead at RAF St Athan, Vale of Glamorgan. Evaluation and excavation 2002–03 ’, Archaeologia Cambrensis 155 ( 2006 ), 49 – 115 .Google Scholar

30 Work co-ordinated by Entec UK, in advance of the redevelopment of MoD St Athan. Entec UK Ltd, Defence Training College and Aerospace Business Park – St Athan: Environmental Statement (2009).

31 By Dr F. Hunter for National Museums Scotland see Britannia 36 (2005), 393, with further references.

32 Type A3 penannular brooch. Other Roman finds from Moray in 2009 comprised a further trumpet brooch from Clarkly Hill, Moray (see Britannia 40 (2009), 225 for previous finds), and a headstud brooch from Stonewells, the pair of one found previously ( Hunter , F. , Beyond the Edge of the Empire ( 2007 ), 65 Google Scholar ).

33 For Peggy Scott’s Restaurant by R. Cachart of SUAT Ltd Mr D. Bowler sent a report.

34 For previous work see Halpin , E. , PSAS 122 ( 1992 ), 171 –82.Google Scholar

35 By Dr D.J. Woolliscroft and P. Morris for the Roman Gask Project and Blairgowrie Geophysics, sponsored by the Roman Research Trust. Magnetic survey covered c. 37 ha resistivity of c. 16 ha focused on areas outside the fortress.

36 Pitts , L.F. and St Joseph , J.K. , Inchtuthil: the Legionary Fortress ( 1985 )Google Scholar Woolliscroft , D.J. and Hoffmann , B. , Rome’s First Frontier ( 2006 ), 62 – 72 .Google Scholar

37 Its form perhaps reminiscent of an amphitheatre.

38 For Mr Graham by T. Barton of SUAT Ltd Mr D. Bowler sent a report. The ground had already been truncated by development before the work took place.

39 By Dr D.J. Woolliscroft of the Roman Gask Project.

40 Work by Dr D.J. Woolliscroft and Dr B. Hoffmann of the Roman Gask Project was funded by Perth & Kinross Heritage Trust. For the line of the road, see Britannia 32 (2001), 319, fig. 4 Woolliscroft , D.J. and Hoffmann , B. , Rome’s First Frontier ( 2006 ), 99 – 103 .Google Scholar

41 By Dr E. Campbell and Dr M. Gondek as part of the SERF Project see Discovery and Excavation in Scotland 2009, 150–1.

42 Further excavations by the SERF project at the hillfort of Green of Invermay (NO 0526 1621) produced a trumpet brooch (Dr T. Poller, pers. comm.), while a stray find of a plate and fantail brooch was recovered by metal-detecting at Grahamstone (NO 17 02 Discovery and Excavation in Scotland 2009, 157).

43 For LPS Contracts by Mr G. Bailey of Falkirk Museum, who sent a full report. The camp is that recorded by Feachem , R.W. , PSAS 89 ( 1955 –6), 336–9Google Scholar for an updated plan of this complex area, see Bailey , G.B. , PSAS 130 ( 2000 ), 470 .Google Scholar

44 The excavation conjoined a trench excavated previously see Britannia 39 (2008), 274, with further references.

45 For Q Hotels by M. Cook of AOC Archaeology see Discovery and Excavation in Scotland 2009, 128.

46 For Forest Enterprise Scotland by D. Sneddon and P. Murtagh of GUARD Dr A. Leslie sent a report.

47 For Complete Property Maintenance Ltd by P.J. Murtagh and C. Rennie of GUARD Dr A. Leslie sent a report.

48 Speller , K. and Leslie , A. , PSAS 132 ( 2002 ), 279 –84.Google Scholar

49 For Allan Water Developments by R. Will and A. Leslie of GUARD.

50 See Breeze , D.J. , ‘The Roman fort on the Antonine Wall at Bearsden’ in Breeze , D.J. (ed.), Studies in Scottish Antiquity ( 1984 ), 32 – 68 Google Scholar Britannia 34 (2003), 304.

51 By Dr R. Jones of Glasgow University, who sent a report. See Britannia 38 (2007), 256 for previous work.

52 Directed for Falkirk Local History Society and Edinburgh Archaeological Field Society by Mr G. Bailey, who sent a report.

53 Revealed by geophysical survey Britannia 39 (2008), 276.

54 Britannia 40 (2009), 228–9.

55 By Mr G. Bailey, who provided a revised plan.

56 By Dr R. Jones of Glasgow University, who sent a report.

57 St Joseph , J.K. , JRS 51 ( 1961 ), 122 .Google Scholar

58 Interpreted in NMRS (NT08SW 91) as a souterrain from aerial photos, although the geophysical results cast doubt on this.

59 For Edinburgh Archaeological Field Society and Blairgowrie Geophysics by I. Hawkins, H.M.D. Jones and P. Morris, who sent a report.

60 Holmes , N. , Excavation of Roman Sites at Cramond, Edinburgh ( 2003 ), 8 – 9 Google Scholar , illus. 2.

61 See Britannia 36 (2005), 399 37 (2006), 387 40 (2009), 230.

62 See Britannia 33 (2002), 289, with further references.

63 Led by I. Hawkins for Edinburgh Archaeological Field Society.

64 RCAHMS, Tenth Report with Inventory of Monuments and Constructions in the Counties of Midlothian and West Lothian (1929), 140–1, no. 177.

65 For Royal Bank of Scotland by Headland Archaeology J. Franklin sent a report. The remains had been notably truncated in this area, and earlier evaluation (Britannia 39 (2008), 277) indicated the remainder of the annexe in this field has been destroyed.

66 Hanson , W.S. , Elginhaugh: a Flavian Fort and its Annexe ( 2007 )Google Scholar , chs 8 and 12.4 the 2009 excavations encompassed the earlier Trench 1.

67 Its eastern extent has now been destroyed.

68 For North Slipperfield Estate by E. Masson-Maclean of GUARD Dr A. Leslie sent a report, and Dr R.H. Jones provided a plot of the camp.

69 NMRS reference number NT15SW 45. The south-west and north-east defences were affected by the development but regrettably fell beyond the extent of the watching-brief.

70 For D. Benson by K. Haines of CFA Archaeology. See Discovery and Excavation in Scotland 2009, 172–3. For the site, see Maxwell , G.S. and Wilson , D.R. , Britannia 18 ( 1987 ), 33 .CrossRefGoogle Scholar

71 For Airtricity by M. Dalland of Headland Archaeology J. Franklin sent a report.

72 Margary , I.D. , Roman Roads in Britain II ( 1957 ), 196 –8Google Scholar , Route 7g. A series of such pits are visible in this area on an RCAHMS aerial photo (DP019755).

73 For A. Young by Dr L. Turner of Rathmell Archaeology, who sent a report.

74 St Joseph , J.K. , Britannia 9 ( 1978 ), 397 – 400 CrossRefGoogle Scholar Maxwell , G.S. and Wilson , D.R. , Britannia 18 ( 1987 ), 34 –5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

75 Surveys by C.-M. Hüssen (Römisch-Germanische Kommission), R.H. Jones (RCAHMS) and W.S. Hanson (Glasgow University), with funding from the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, and by Dr R. Jones (Glasgow University).

76 By C.-M. Hüssen, R.H. Jones and W.S. Hanson, with funding from the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut.

77 Frere , S.S. and St Joseph , J.K. , Roman Britain from the Air ( 1983 ), 123 –6Google Scholar St Joseph , J.K. , Glasgow Archaeological Journal 4 ( 1976 ), 10 CrossRefGoogle Scholar Maxwell , G.S. , The Romans in Scotland ( 1989 ), 69 – 70 .Google Scholar

78 By Dr R. Jones, who sent a report.

79 St Joseph , J.K. , Glasgow Archaeological Journal 4 ( 1976 ), 7 – 10 .CrossRefGoogle Scholar

80 By C.-M. Hüssen, R.H. Jones and W.S. Hanson, with funding from the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut.

81 Clarke , J. , Davidson , J.M. , Robertson , A.S. and St Joseph , J.K. , The Roman Occupation of South-Western Scotland ( 1952 ), 117 –20Google Scholar Maxwell , G.S. and Wilson , D.R. , Britannia 18 ( 1987 ), 23 –4CrossRefGoogle Scholar , pl. IXB.

82 Excavations directed for Tyne and Wear Museums by P. Bidwell, N. Hodgson and G.C. Stobbs with the support of Earthwatch Institute. Dr N. Hodgson sent information.

83 Excavation by A. Goode, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Sir Robert McAlpine Limited. R. Taylor-Wilson sent information.

84 Excavation by A. Goode, Pre-Construct Archaeology Limited, for C. Spencer Ltd on behalf of Network Rail. R. Taylor-Wilson sent information.

85 Evaluation for Balfour Beatty carried out by Tyne and Wear Museums Archaeology. Dr N. Hodgson sent information.

86 Under the direction of A. Birley.

87 Bidwell , P.T. , The Roman Fort of Vindolanda, at Chesterholm, Northumberland ( 1985 ).Google Scholar

88 Under the direction of J. Blake. For previous work see Britannia 40 ( 2009 ), 233 –4.Google Scholar

89 Excavations directed by T. Wilmott of English Heritage’s Archaeological Projects Team in partnership with Professor I. Haynes of the Department of Archaeology, University of Newcastle. M. Jecock sent information.

90 Found by Messrs D. Jackson and A. Clark while searching with metal-detectors. BM Refs: 2009 T51 and T715. R. Abdy sent information.

91 See Cool , H.E.M. , The Roman Cemetery at Brougham, Cumbria. Excavations 1966–67 ( 2004 ).Google Scholar

92 Excavation by Oxford Archaeology North on behalf of United Utilities. Information sent by I. Miller and A. Plummer.

93 Work by M. Kirby for CFA Archaeology Ltd. Ms S. Anderson sent information.

94 The project is a partnership involving: Durham County Council’s Archaeology Section the Department of Archaeology (including Archaeological Services), Durham University the School of Archaeology, Department of Classics, Stanford University and the Architectural and Archaeological Society of Durham and Northumberland. Dr D. Mason sent information.

95 By Archaeological Services Durham University. Dr D. Mason sent information.

96 See Britannia 40 (2009), 235.

97 Bishop , M.C. et al. , ‘ Excavations in the Roman fort at Chester-le-Street (Concangis), Church Chare, 1990–91 ’, Arch Ael 5 21 ( 1993 ), 29 – 86 .Google Scholar

98 Dr D. Mason sent information.

99 Carried out by Archaeological Services Durham University, for The Friends of Longovicium. The project was funded by the Heritage Lottery Fund and Durham County Council. For previous work see Britannia 40 (2009), 236. Dr D. Mason sent information.

100 For previous accounts see Britannia 38 (2007), 264–5 (with plan) 39 (2008), 285 40 (2009), 236. Dr D. Mason sent information.

101 For the recently published results of previous work see Cool , H. and Mason , D.J.P. (eds), Roman Piercebridge: Excavations by D W Harding and P Scott 1969–1981 , Architectural and Archaeological Society of Durham and Northumberland Research Report 7 ( 2008 ).Google Scholar

102 UBA 13141. Dr D. Mason sent information.

103 See Myres , J.N.L. Steer , K.A. and Chitty , A.M.H. , Yorkshire Archaeological Journal 40 ( 1962 ), 1 – 77 .Google Scholar

104 See C.S. Dobinson, Yorkshire Archaeological Society Roman Antiquities Section Bulletin 2, 7–8.

105 Directed by Ms R. Ferraby and Professor M. Millett. Ms Ferraby sent information.

106 Excavations by Archaeological Services Durham University for Jacobs Engineering Ltd on behalf of North Yorkshire County Council. Mr P. Carne sent information.

107 Excavations by Archaeological Services Durham University for Jacobs Engineering Ltd on behalf of North Yorkshire County Council. Mr P. Carne sent information.

108 Found by Messrs M. Taylor, S. Blackwell and J. Szuk while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref.: 2009 T12. R. Abdy sent information.

109 Found by Messrs R. Booth and D. Mulliner while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref.: 2009 T286. R. Abdy sent information.

110 Work on behalf of Moorside Developments by D. Evans for York Archaeological Trust. C. Kyriacou sent information.

111 Excavation on behalf of The Blossom Street Venture by I. Milsted for York Archaeological Trust. C. Kyriacou sent information.

112 Work for Rogers Homes, York by D. Evans for York Archaeological Trust. C. Kyriacou sent information.

113 See Britannia 36 (2005), 412–13 for previous work.

114 Work for Moorside Developments by I. Milsted for York Archaeological Trust. C. Kyriacou sent information.

115 See Britannia 40 (2009), 237.

116 Excavation directed by S. Roskams. Dr C. Neal sent information.

117 Found by Mrs M. Dandy while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref.: 2008 T622. R. Abdy sent information. In same area as BM Ref.: 2008 T672 and third hoard – BM Ref.: 2008 T723. R. Abdy sent information.

118 Found, with pottery, by Mrs M. Dandy while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref.: 2008 T672. In same area as BM Ref.: 2008 T622 and third hoard – BM Ref.: 2008 T723. R. Abdy sent information.

119 Found by Messrs D. Watson and D. Barwise while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref.: 2008 T705. R. Abdy sent information.

120 Found by Mr D. Crowe while searching with a metal-detector. R. Abdy sent information.

121 The ‘North Dalton Roman hoard’ BM Refs: 2006 T148 (15 coins) 2007 T185 (3 coins) 2008 T153 (1 coin). This find (BM Ref. 2009 T164) can be considered as a third addendum to this Roman hoard.

122 Abramson , P. et al. ., Roman Castleford Excavations 1974–85. Volume II. The Structural and Environmental Evidence ( 1999 ), 20 .Google Scholar

123 Excavation undertaken by Field Archaeology Specialists Ltd on behalf of The James Taylor Dental Practice. Ms C. Spall sent information.

124 Excavation by Oxford Archaeology North on behalf of Mr L. Fenton. Information provided by J. Zant and sent by E. Mercer.

125 Found while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref.: 2009 T45. R. Abdy sent information.

126 Found by Mr M. Longfield while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref.: 2009 T612. Addendum to a known hoard: CHRB XI, 49. Total now stands at 17 silver denarii from the Republic to Tiberius. R. Abdy sent information.

127 Excavations by Field Archaeology Specialists Ltd on behalf of Lincolnshire County Council. Ms C. Spall sent information.

128 See JRS 39 (1949), 68, with fig. 9.

129 Evaluation by Lindsey Archaeological Services on behalf of the City of Lincoln Council. Dr M.J. Jones supplied information.

130 Excavations on behalf of Mr M. Browne, directed by C. Clay for Allen Archaeology Ltd. M. Allen sent information.

131 Excavations on behalf of Clive Adams Associates, directed by C. Clay for Allen Archaeology Ltd. M. Allen sent information.

132 Report by D. Field in English Heritage Report Series, no. AI/18/2005.

133 Survey by English Heritage’s Archaeological Investigations Team, led by Mark Bowden and David Field as part of the Urban Commons Project. Dr M.J. Jones sent information.

134 Excavation by Pre-Construct Archaeology (Lincoln), on behalf of Lindum Homes. Dr M.J. Jones sent information.

135 Work undertaken by Archaeological Project Services for CgMs Consulting. S. Malone sent information.

136 Excavation for NDC Group Ltd was directed by C. Palmer-Brown and J. Rylatt for Pre-Construct Archaeology. C. Palmer-Brown and Dr M.J. Jones sent information.

137 Work undertaken by Archaeological Project Services for Westleigh Homes. S. Malone sent information.

138 Excavation by C. Spence and Z. Tomlinson, Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln. C. Spence sent information.

139 Found by Mr C. Alefounder while searching with metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T688. R. Abdy sent information.

140 Found by Messrs A. James, P. Wigginton and J. Radford while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref. 2009 T669. R. Abdy sent information.

141 Work for the Wirksworth Roman Project directed by A. Shone, who sent information.

142 As noted in Britannia 39 (2008), 293.

143 Palfreyman , A. and Ebbins , S. , ‘ A Romano-British quern-manufacturing site at Blackbrook ’, Derbyshire Archaeological Journal 127 ( 2007 ), 34 –7.Google Scholar

144 Lomas , J. , ‘ A Romano-British site at Alport Hill, Ashleyhay ’, Derbyshire Archaeological Journal 81 ( 1961 ), 141 –5.Google Scholar

145 Found by Messrs P. Bolam, T. Cooke, W. Dunn, P. Hill, M. Rhodes and J. Sears while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref. 2009 T185. R. Abdy sent information.

146 Found in 2008 by Messrs J. Lee, L. Wagstaff and K. Blackburn while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref. 2009 T88. R. Abdy sent information.

147 Found by Mr I. Botley, while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2007 T664. R. Abdy sent updated information.

148 Found by Mr R. Hamilton while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T193. R. Abdy sent information.

150 Found by Mr F. Taylor while searching with a metal-detector. BM Refs 2006 T452 and 2008 T220. R. Abdy sent information.

151 Found by Mr T. Hayward while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T431. R. Abdy sent information.

152 Work on behalf of the Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity, University of Birmingham was directed by R. White, who sent information.

153 For earlier work, see Gaffney , V.L. and White , R.H. , Wroxeter, The Cornovii, and the Urban Process. Final Report on the Wroxeter Hinterland Project 1994–1997. Volume 1: Researching the Hinterland , Journal of Roman Archaeology Supp. Ser. 68 ( 2007 )Google Scholar , 150–2, 163–6.

154 Willis in Gaffney and White, op. cit. (note 153), 174–5.

155 Found while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T392. Only two coins were recorded in detail. I. Leins sent information.

156 Found by Mr T. Sapwill while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T158. R. Abdy sent information.

157 Work by B. Gethin, Warwickshire Museum, for John Lewis Partnership and WCC Transport and Highways. N. Palmer sent information.

158 Work by I. Greig, Warwickshire Museum for Mr J. Kenyon. N. Palmer sent information.

159 Found by Mr M. Longfield while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T612. R. Abdy sent information. For the original find see S. Wear and J. Williams, CHRB XI, p. 49.

160 Work by S. Joyce and L. Coleman of Cotswold Archaeology for Hyder Consulting and Morrison Construction. N. Holbrook sent information.

161 Work by S.C. Palmer, Warwickshire Museum, for Mr N. Clough. N. Palmer sent information.

162 Work by S.C. Palmer, Warwickshire Museum, for Mr and Mrs D. Squires. N. Palmer sent information.

163 Work by S.C. Palmer, Warwickshire Museum, for Trudson (Honiley) Ltd. N. Palmer sent information.

164 Work by B. Gethin and P. Thompson, Warwickshire Museum on behalf of Mr M. Greenwood. N. Palmer sent information.

165 Work by G. Speed, University of Leicester Archaeological Services, for Tarmac Ltd. X.A185.2009. N. Cooper sent information.

166 Work by J. Harvey, University of Leicester Archaeological Services. X.A6.2006. N. Cooper sent information.

167 Work by G. Richards, University of Leicester Archaeological Services. OAKRM 2009.8. N. Cooper sent information.

168 Work by N. Finn, University of Leicester Archaeological Services. A11 2009. N. Cooper sent information.

169 Work by R. Kipling, University of Leicester Archaeological Services, for De Montfort University. N. Cooper sent information.

170 Work by T. Higgins, University of Leicester Archaeological Services. A7.2009. N. Cooper sent information.

171 Found by Mr A. Jones while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T748 (addenda to BM 2008 T197). R. Abdy sent information.

172 Work by G. Jones and J. Cooper, University of Leicester Archaeological Services for Cawrey Ltd. X.A138.2009. N. Cooper sent information.

173 Work by Mark Peachey of Archaeological Project Services. X.A92.2009. N. Cooper sent information.

174 Work by L. Hunt and G. Jones, University of Leicester Archaeological Services. X.A121.2008. N. Cooper sent information.

175 Work by Archaeological Project Services for Bela Developments. S. Malone sent information.

176 Work by Archaeological Project Services for Milton Estates. S. Malone sent information.

177 Work by T. Phillips of Oxford Archaeology East. E. Popescu sent information.

178 Work by A. Pickstone and R. Mortimer of Oxford Archaeology East for English Heritage. E. Popescu sent information.

179 Excavation by R. Atkins of Oxford Archaeology East. E. Popescu sent information.

180 Work by T. Fletcher of Oxford Archaeology East. E. Popescu sent information.

181 Work by R. Atkins of Oxford Archaeology East. E. Popescu sent information.

182 Evaluation by J. House of Oxford Archaeology East. E. Popescu sent information.

183 Work by M. Luke, B. Barber and R. Gregson of Albion Archaeology. M. Luke sent information.

184 For previous work see Britannia 38 (2007), 278.

185 As note above. See also Dawson , M. , Archaeology of the Bedford Region , BAR British Ser. 373 ( 2004 ).Google Scholar

186 Work by L. Wood, Museum of London Archaeology, for Network Rail (BAL-HE-BRS09). V. Gardiner sent information.

187 Work by R. Lythe, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Barwood LaSalle Land Limited Partnership. T. Vitali sent information.

188 Work by L. Coleman and D. Cudlip of Cotswold Archaeology. N. Holbrook sent information.

189 Work by G. Williams, John Moore Heritage Services. D. Gilbert sent information.

190 Work under the supervision of English Heritage’s Geophysical Survey Team in support of the Romans in the Hambleden Valley Project. M. Jecock sent information.

191 Cocks , A.H. , ‘ A Romano-British homestead in the Hambleden Valley, Bucks ’, Archaeologia 71 ( 1921 ), 141 –98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

192 Work by D. Stansbie, Oxford Archaeology South, on behalf of CgMs consulting, acting for Cofton Ltd and Places for People. E. Biddulph sent information.

193 Work by J. Ford, Oxford Archaeology South, for Abingdon Museum. E. Biddulph sent information.

194 Work by D. Heale, John Moore Heritage Services. D. Gilbert sent information.

195 Excavation directed by P. Booth for the Discovering Dorchester project, a collaboration between Oxford Archaeology South, Oxford University, Dorchester Museum and the people of Dorchester on Thames. E. Biddulph sent information.

196 Evaluation by B. Dean, Oxford Archaeology South, for GBS Consulting. E. Biddulph sent information.

197 Work by J. Moore, John Moore Heritage Services. D. Gilbert sent information.

198 Work by J. Bennett of Cotswold Archaeology. N. Holbrook sent information.

199 Work by S. Hammond, John Moore Heritage Services. D. Gilbert sent information.

200 Found by Mr M. Dover while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T295. R. Abdy sent information.

201 Work by Archaeological Project Services for Thomas Faire Architects. S. Malone sent information.

202 Found by Mr P. and Mrs S. Buckley while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref. 2008 T640 (previous finds BM 2004 T463 and BM 2006 T149). R. Abdy sent information.

203 Found by Mr S. Brown while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T408. R. Abdy sent information.

204 Found by Mr C. Mann and Mr K. Peters while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref. 2008 T707. R. Abdy sent information.

205 Work by J. Tabor, Cambridge Archaeological Unit for Orwell Housing Association. J. Plouviez sent information.

206 Work by J. Craven, Suffolk County Council Archaeological Service for Hartismere High School. J. Plouviez sent information.

207 Found while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T109. The coins were found in and around the area of a previous find (BM Ref. 2008 T325) and are consistent in date and type. They can therefore be considered as addenda to this hoard. I. Leins sent information.

208 Found by Mr A. Smith while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T584. R. Abdy sent information.

209 See Guest , P.S.W. , The Late Roman Gold and Silver Coins from the Hoxne Treasure ( 2005 )Google Scholar , and Britannia 40 ( 2009 ), 253Google Scholar .

210 See Britannia 40 (2009), 254 and Bales , E. , A Roman Maltings at Beck Row, Mildenhall, Suffolk , East Anglian Archaeology Occasional Paper 20 ( 2004 ).Google Scholar Work by J. Craven, Suffolk County Council Archaeological Service for Persimmon Homes Anglia. J. Plouviez sent information.

211 Work by M. Brett of Cotswold Archaeology. J. Plouviez sent information.

212 Found by Messrs J. Hallis and N. Howard while searching with metal-detectors, with subsequent excavation by Suffolk County Council Archaeological Service. BM Ref. 2009 T243. R. Abdy sent information.

213 Found by Messrs A. Smith, R. Atfield and T. Marsh while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref. 2009 T622. R. Abdy sent information.

214 Found by Mr S. Silvy while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T496. R. Abdy sent information.

215 Britannia 40 (2009), 256.

216 Work by B. Holloway for Colchester Archaeological Trust, and R. Masefield of RPS (consultants) on behalf of Taylor Wimpey as part of the continuing Colchester Garrison redevelopment project. H. Brooks sent information.

217 Work by B. Holloway for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Ellisdale Builders. H. Brooks sent information.

218 Work by C. Lister for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Scott Properties. H. Brooks sent information.

219 Work by C. Lister for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Colchester and Ipswich Museums. H. Brooks sent information.

220 Work by B. Holloway for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Royal Mail Group. H. Brooks sent information.

221 Found in 2007 by Mr B. Smith while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T644. R. Abdy sent information.

222 Wickenden , N.P. , Excavations at Great Dunmow, Essex , East Anglian Archaeology Report 41/Chelmsford Archaeological Trust Report Number 7 ( 1988 ).Google Scholar

223 Work by B. Holloway for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Gainsmead Ltd. H. Brooks sent information.

224 Work by A. Wightman for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Foxley Builders. H. Brooks sent information.

225 Work by B. Holloway for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Marden Homes. H. Brooks sent information.

226 Work by S. Lawrence of Oxford Archaeology South for Skanska and Balfour Beatty. E. Biddulph sent information.

227 Work by B Holloway for Colchester Archaeological Trust. H. Brooks sent information.

228 Work by S. Foreman of Oxford Archaeology South for DP World. E. Biddulph sent information.

229 Found by Messrs A. Angus, S. Stone, B. Purpura and M. Griffith while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref. 2009 T614. R. Abdy sent information.

230 Found by Mr J. Curzon while searching with a metal-detector. BM Refs 2009 T3 and 2009 T465. R. Abdy sent information. Uttlesford I = BM 2008 T655 (13+ copper-alloy nummi to a.d. 378).

231 Work by A. Wightman for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Foxley Builders. H. Brooks sent information. For the earlier site see Hodder , I. , Wendens Ambo: The Excavation of Iron Age and Romano-British Settlement ( 1982 ).Google Scholar H. Brooks sent information.

232 Work by B. Holloway for Colchester Archaeological Trust on behalf of Clarity Ecoworks Ltd. H. Brooks sent information.

233 This and the original hoard (BM Ref. 2008 T412 Britannia 40 (2009), 256) were found by Mr J. Davey while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T60. R. Abdy sent information.

234 Work by A. Daykin, Museum of London Archaeology, for Corporation of London Department of Planning and Transportation (BDJ09). V. Gardiner sent information.

235 Work by J. Taylor, Museum of London Archaeology, for Hines UK (CNV08). V. Gardiner sent information.

236 Britannia 40 (2009), 257–8.

237 Work by K. Pitt, Museum of London Archaeology, for The Pinnacle No. 1 Ltd (CYQ05). V. Gardiner sent information.

238 Work by G. Stevenson and R. Wroe-Brown, Museum of London Archaeology, for Land Securities (FEU08). V. Gardiner sent information.

239 Work by A. Daykin and P. Thrale, Museum of London Archaeology, for Corporation of London (GRJ09). V. Gardiner sent information.

240 Work by T. Mackinder, D. Sankey and A. Lerz, Museum of London Archaeology, for City Offices LLP (NSD06). V. Gardiner sent information.

241 Work by R. Humphrey, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Jones Lang LaSalle on behalf of GE Real Estate. T. Vitali sent information.

242 Work by J. Taylor, J. Langthorne and P. Jorgensen, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Lovat Lane Ltd. T. Vitali sent information.

243 Work by A. Daykin, Museum of London Archaeology, for Corporation of London Department of Planning and Transportation (QUO09). V. Gardiner sent information.

244 Work by T. Mackinder, Museum of London Archaeology, for NM Rothschild & Sons (SII07). V. Gardiner sent information.

245 Found during excavation by the Department for Urban Archaeology in 1994 and recorded in 2009 at the London Archaeological Archive and Research Centre by James Gerrard. R. Abdy sent information.

246 Work by Bruce Ferguson, Museum of London Archaeology, for Grehan Contractors Ltd (JNW09). V. Gardiner sent information.

247 Work by J. Payne, R. Humphrey and N. Hawkins, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for CgMs Consulting on behalf of Retail Design Ltd. T. Vitali sent information.

248 Work by J. Taylor, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Green Acre Homes SE. T. Vitali sent information.

249 Work by P. Cardiff, Museum of London Archaeology, for EDF Energy (RCM09). V. Gardiner sent information.

250 Work by H. Lewis, Museum of London Archaeology, for Transport for London (HLW06). V. Gardiner sent information.

251 Work by I. Grosso, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Pilgrim Trustee Services Ltd. T. Vitali sent information.

252 Work by R. Bull and K. Pitt, Museum of London Archaeology, for Family Mosaic (NEU09). V. Gardiner sent information.

253 Work by A. Fairman, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Inspace Partnerships. T. Vitali sent information.

254 Work by A. Daykin, Museum of London Archaeology, for Lambeth Borough Council (MSF09). V. Gardiner sent information.

255 Davis , B. , ‘ The Roman road from West Wickham to London ’, Surrey Archaeological Collections 43 ( 1935 ), 61 – 83 .Google Scholar

256 Work by B. Ferguson, Museum of London Archaeology, for Loates-Taylor Shannon on behalf of King’s College London (HKP08). V. Gardiner sent information.

257 Watching-brief and excavation by R. Cowie, Museum of London Archaeology, for Skanska GrantRail (AYF08). V. Gardiner sent information.

258 Work by Tony Mackinder, Museum of London Archaeology, for New London Bridge House Ltd (LBN08). V. Gardiner sent information.

259 Work by A. Daykin, Museum of London Archaeology, for Faithful & Gould/W S Atkins Group (JFN08). V. Gardiner sent information.

260 Work by A. Daykin, Museum of London Archaeology, for the Board of Trustees of the Tate Modern (TMB09). V. Gardiner sent information.

261 Work by S. Holden, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Acorn Property Group. T. Vitali sent information.

262 Work by I. Grosso, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Mr Sunil Varma. T. Vitali sent information.

263 Work by I. Grosso, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Igloo Regeneration (GP) Ltd. T. Vitali sent information.

264 Work by D. Killock, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for London Realty Limited. T. Vitali sent information.

265 Work by D. Saxby, Museum of London Archaeology, for Network Rail (BVT09). V. Gardiner sent information.

266 Work by P. Askew and I. Howell, Museum of London Archaeology, for Network Rail (BVQ09). V. Gardiner sent information.

267 Work by M. Ruddy, Museum of London Archaeology, for Network Rail (THB09). V. Gardiner sent information.

268 Work by I. Bright, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for CgMs Consulting on behalf of Higgins Homes. T. Vitali sent information.

269 Work by S. Maher, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for the Diocese of Brentford. T. Vitali sent information.

270 Work by R. Taylor and L. Fowler, Museum of London Archaeology, for Longmartin Properties (USM06). V. Gardiner sent information.

271 Work by D. Cudlip of Cotswold Archaeology. N. Holbrook sent information.

272 Work by K. Welsh of Oxford Archaeology South for CgMs Consulting. E. Biddulph sent information.

273 Work by S. Hammond and D. Gilbert, John Moore Heritage Services. D. Gilbert sent information.

274 Found by Mr P. Burton while searching with metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T116. R. Abdy sent information.

275 Excavation by the South Cadbury Environs Project/Birmingham University. R. Abdy sent information.

276 Hayward , L. , ‘ The Roman villa at Lufton, near Yeovil ’, Proceedings of the Somerset Archaeological and Natural History Society 97 ( 1952 ), 91 – 112 Google Scholar Hayward , L. , ‘ The Roman villa at Lufton, near Yeovil ’, Proceedings of the Somerset Archaeological and Natural History Society 116 ( 1972 ), 59 – 77 .Google Scholar

277 Work directed by J. Gerrard for Yeovil Archaeological and Local History Society. Geophysical survey report lodged with the Somerset HER No. 26101. J. Gerrard sent information.

278 Work by D. Gilbert, John Moore Heritage Services. D. Gilbert sent information.

279 Found by Mr W. Churcher while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T11. R. Abdy sent information.

280 Found by Mr J. Hill while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2008 T168. R. Abdy sent information.

281 Found by Mr M. Thomas while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T558. R. Abdy sent information.

282 Found by Mr N. Barrett while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T233. R. Abdy sent information.

283 Found by Mr G. Bulley while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2008 T594. R. Abdy sent information.

284 Work by P. Murray of Oxford Archaeology South for CgMs Consulting on behalf of Blue Living Ltd. E. Biddulph sent information.

285 Found by Mr R. Fly while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T600. R. Abdy sent information.

286 Britannia 34 (2003), 351–2. Work for the University of Reading directed by M. Fulford and A. Clarke. M. Fulford sent information.

287 Fulford , M. Clarke , A. and Eckardt , H. , Life and Labour in Late Roman Silchester. Excavations in Insula IX since 1997 , Britannia Monograph 22 ( 2006 )Google Scholar Fulford , M. and Clarke , A. , Silchester: The City in Transition: The Mid-Roman Occupation of Insula IX, c. AD 125–250/300. A Report on Excavations undertaken since 1997 , Britannia Monograph 25 ( 2010 ).Google Scholar

288 Partly published in Clarke , A. et al. . Internet Archaeology 21 /4 ( 2007 ).Google Scholar

289 Fulford , M. and Timby , J. , Late Iron Age and Roman Silchester. Excavations on the Site of the Forum Basilica 1977, 1980–1986 , Britannia Monograph 15 ( 2000 )Google Scholar , 8–37, figs 5–7.

290 Fulford , M. , ‘ Nero and Britain: the palace of the client king at Calleva and imperial policy towards the province after Boudicca ’, Britannia 39 ( 2008 ), 1 – 13 .CrossRefGoogle Scholar

291 Work by English Heritage’s Geophysical Survey Team (EH Res Dept Rep Ser 104-2009). M. Jecock sent information.

292 Found by Mr J. Jerram and the Isle of Wight Metal Detecting Club while searching with metal-detectors. BM Ref. 2009 T366. R. Abdy sent information.

293 Found by members of the Isle of Wight Metal Detecting Club. BM Ref. 2009 T329 (addenda). R. Abdy sent information.

294 Found by Mr K. Mordle while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T407. R. Abdy sent information.

295 Found while searching with a metal-detector. BM Ref. 2009 T451. I. Leins sent information.

296 Work by G. Rapson, Museum of London Archaeology, for EDF Energy (ES-FDH08). V. Gardiner sent information.

297 Work by G. Rapson, Museum of London Archaeology, for EDF Energy (ES-BKW09). V. Gardiner sent information.

298 Work for the Roman Studies Group of the Surrey Archaeological Society directed by D. Bird, who sent information.

299 Darwin had close personal links with the site owner. When, in 1877, trenches were opened to pursue the discovery of part of a Roman building found by chance the previous year, he visited and had a trench dug so that he could examine earthworm activity, and published a (schematic) section. Anon , See , ‘ Recent discovery of the remains of a Roman villa at Abinger, Surrey ’, The Builder 36 ( 1878 ), 19 – 20 Google Scholar Darwin , C. , The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms, with Observations on their Habits ( 1888 )Google Scholar , 180–94, with section on 182 Evans , C. , ‘ Small agencies and great consequences: Darwin’s archaeology ’, Antiquity 83 (320) (June 2009), 475–88Google Scholar , especially 480.

300 Work for the Roman Studies Group of the Surrey Archaeological Society directed by D. Bird, who sent information. For previous work see Britannia 38 (2007), 299 39 (2008), 331–2 40 (2009), 275–6.

301 Final plan in Lowther , A.W.G. , ‘ Excavations at Ashtead, Surrey. Third report (1929) ’, Surrey Archaeological Collections 38 .2 ( 1930 )Google Scholar , plan opposite p. 148.

302 See Cooper , T.S. , Gower , J.L. and Gower , M. , ‘ The Roman villa at Whitebeech, Chiddingfold: excavations in 1888 and subsequently ’, Surrey Archaeological Collections 75 ( 1984 ), 57 – 83 .Google Scholar

303 Work for Roman Studies Group of Surrey Archaeological Society by D. and A. Graham, who sent information.

304 Bird , D.G. , ‘ Chiddingfold Roman villa: a suggested reinterpretation ’, Surrey Archaeological Collections 89 ( 2002 ), 245 –8.Google Scholar

305 Work by S. Holden, Pre-Construct Archaeology Ltd, for Ewell Castle School. T. Vitali sent information.

306 Work by J. Holman, Canterbury Archaeological Trust, for Canterbury City Council. J. Elder sent information.

307 Work by S. Pratt, Canterbury Archaeological Trust, north-west of the river for Biddle and Biddle on behalf of Bellway Homes and south-east of the river funding by Hotel du Vin and Cloudy Bay. S. Pratt sent information.

308 Work by A. Gollop, Canterbury Archaeological Trust, for Abbott Construction Limited in advance of construction of retail and residential properties. J. Elder sent information.

309 Jenkins , F. , ‘ Archaeological notebook, Canterbury, 1949–51 ’, Archaeologia Cantiana 64 ( 1951 ), 71 –2.Google Scholar

310 Work by D. Robertson, Canterbury Archaeological Trust, for Fusion Etc Ltd. J. Elder sent information.

311 P. Bennett, ‘Linden Grove’, Canterbury’s Archaeology 1987–1988, 6.


Tarrant Tabor. Olbrzym, który miał zbombardować Berlin

W czasie pierwszej wojny światowej wykrystalizowała się idea bombardowań strategicznych jako sposobu na zwycięstwo. Miała to być alternatywa dla rzezi w okopach przecinających Europę Zachodnią. Aby jednak zrealizować tę wizję, potrzeba było samolotów o dużym zasięgu i dużym udźwigu. Jak na ówczesne standardy – ogromnych. Tarrant Tabor z pewnością zasługiwał na to określenie. Okazał się też niewypałem i zapisał się w historii lotnictwa jako jeden z najbardziej nieudanych samolotów wojskowych wszech czasów.

Z motyką na słońce

6 czerwca 1918 roku powołano do życia Niezależne Siły Powietrzne, z Hugh Trenchardem na czele i z kwaterą główną pod Nancy. Greg Baughen pisze, iż „było to wydarzenie daleko donioślejsze niż utworzenie Królewskich Sił Powietrznych. Nowa formacja stała się początkiem nowej ery, a przynajmniej taką nadzieję mieli orędownicy niezależnych sił lotniczych. Trenchard polecił dążenie do nasilenia bombardowań celów przemysłowych w Niemczech, za co miał odpowiadać wyłącznie przed Ministerstwem Lotnictwa”. Już jesienią 1917 roku szukano bombowca, który mógłby dolecieć nad Rzeszę wprost z Anglii. Wyeliminowałoby to wszelkie problemy w kwestii koordynacji z Francuzami, problemy, których nie dałoby się uniknąć, gdyby bombowce miały stacjonować we Francji. Ceną za to była jednak konieczność wydłużenia zasięgu o dodatkowe 300–400 kilometrów.

Fundamentem planowanej potęgi Niezależnych Sił Powietrznych miały się stać bombowce Handley Page V/1500. Prototyp tej drogiej i ogromnej maszyny o rozpiętości 38,4 metra (prawie 3 metry więcej niż P-8A Poseidon) oblatano 22 maja. 13 czerwca utworzono pierwszą jednostkę mającą latać na V/1500 – 166. Eskadrę. W Ministerstwie Lotnictwa snuto wizji o zgromadzeniu 800 bombowców tego typu na potrzeby zmasowanej ofensywy powietrznej w 1919 roku. Ale wizje te nie miały jak się spełnić. I nie chodzi bynajmniej o to, że wojna dobiegła końca już w roku 1918.

Tabor wytoczony z hali w Farnborough, w której powstał.
(Imperial War Museum)

Największy problem wiązał się z kosztem produkcji V/1500 – równie ogromnym jak sam bombowiec. Był on dwukrotnie droższy niż Handley Page O/400 i wymagał dużo większego nakładu pracy na ziemi. O ile O/400 był napędzany dwoma silnikami Rolls-Royce Eagle VIII, o tyle V/1500 miał aż cztery takie silniki (dwa napędzały śmigła ciągnące, dwa – śmigła pchające). Wskutek tego każda eskadra bombowa miała dysponować jedynie czterema samolotami w służbie liniowej i dwoma rezerwowymi. W takich okolicznościach posłanie do walki osiemdziesięciu bombowców już byłoby sukcesem. O ośmiuset trudno było nawet marzyć.

Zamiast tego pojawiły się inne marzenia – o bombowcu tańszym i prostszym w produkcji, bombowcu, który mógłby wyprzeć V/1500 i zrealizować plany ogromnych nalotów na stolicę Rzeszy. I właśnie tutaj wkroczył na scenę niejaki W.G. Tarrant. W latach pokoju trudnił się on fachem, który dziś nazwalibyśmy deweloperką, a w czasie wojny produkował łatwe w transporcie drewniane baraki dla brytyjskich żołnierzy we Francji.

Berliński bombowiec

Już w październiku 1917 roku Tarrant przedstawił brytyjskim władzom lotniczym koncepcję bombowca o zasięgu ponad tysiąca kilometrów i przenoszącego około 5400 kilogramów bomb (dwa razy więcej niż ćwierć wieku później B-17G Flying Fortress!). Pomysł odrzucono, ale Tarrant się nie zraził i kilka miesięcy później spróbował ponownie i tym razem zdołał zainteresować Williama Weira. Greg Baughen pisze o ich spotkaniu w styczniu 1918 roku tak:

Weir zasugerował, że wersja z nowym amerykańskim silnikiem Liberty powinna być w stanie dotrzeć nad Berlin. Tarrant sądził, że cztery silniki Liberty nie wystarczą, ale obiecał zrobić, co w jego mocy. Weira ta nieśmiała odpowiedź nie zniechęciła. Zażądał, aby do sierpnia Tarrant zbudował dwadzieścia bombowców. To zdumiewające stanowisko odzwierciedlało gęstniejącą atmosferę niepewności wokół całej sprawy bombardowania strategicznego.

Do prac projektowych Tarrant najął Waltera H. Barlinga, dotąd pracującego w Royal Aircraft Factory, i Marcela Lobelle’a z firmy Martinsyde, produkującej głównie motocykle, ale mającej też na koncie kilka ciekawych samolotów, zwłaszcza myśliwiec Buzzard. We trójkę obmyślili oni projekt bombowca napędzanego czterema silnikami Siddeley Tiger w nietypowym dziś, ale wówczas popularnym układzie – dwa dla śmigieł ciągnących i dwa dla pchających (wszystkie dwułopatowe). Samolot miał mieć układ dwupłatowy z dolnym płatem o znacznie mniejszej rozpiętości. Ostatecznie prognozy co do osiągów zrewidowano i przyjęto, że samolot będzie w stanie z lotnisk w Norfolku zabrać 2 tysiące kilogramów bomb nad Berlin lub 4 tysiące kilogramów nad Hamburg.

Rozwój Tigerów postępował jednak zbyt powoli, toteż cztery Tigery wymieniono na sześć silników Napier Lion o mocy 450 koni mechanicznych i niejako przy okazji dodano trzeci, górny, płat o takich samych wymiarach jak dolny. Dwa dodatkowe Liony zainstalowano na niegdysiejszym górnym, a teraz środkowym płacie, wysoko ponad środkiem ciężkości i mniej więcej 8,5 metra nad ziemią, co wkrótce miało się okazać fatalną decyzją. Tarrant i Barling chcieli też, aby po wojnie samolot bombowy dało się łatwo przerobić na pasażerski – mogący latać do Indii. Mimo ogromu płatowca cały samolot – dla którego wybrano nazwę Tabor – miał być prosty w budowie, tak aby można było zaangażować niewykwalifikowanych robotników, a użycie metalu miało być ograniczone do niezbędnego minimum.

Walter Barling przy podwoziu XNBL-1.
(History of Aviation Collection, U. of Texas, Dallas)

Zbudowanie takiego kolosa wymagało specjalnych przygotowań. Montaż prowadzono w ogromnym hangarze sterowcowym w Farnborough, gdzie Tabora ustawiono bokiem do drzwi, bo tylko tak się mieścił. Oznaczało to, że gotowy prototyp (oznaczony numerem F1765) nie mógł wyjechać z hangaru na własnych kołach. Trzeba było ułożyć szyny, na których samolot dało się wytoczyć skrzydłem do przodu.

Tabor wywierał na obserwatorach przytłaczające wrażenie. Kryty sklejką opływowy, zgrabny kadłub był szerszy niż w Concordzie. Górny płat rozciągał się 11,35 metra nad ziemią. Końcówki środkowego płata dzieliło równo 40 metrów – ponad 8 metrów więcej niż w B-17G. Naukowcy i inżynierowie, którzy przeprowadzili badania naziemne prototypu, orzekli jednak, iż Tabor ma środek ciężkości przesunięty zanadto do tyłu. W związku z tym, wbrew zdaniu samego Tarranta, w nosie bombowca umieszczono dodatkowy balast: 454 kilogramy ołowiu (około 40 decymetrów sześciennych). Decyzja ta mogła mieć decydujący wpływ na przebieg późniejszych wydarzeń.

Katastrofa

Wielka Wojna dobiegła końca. Bombowce strategiczne już dawno przestały być pilną potrzebą, ale wciąż przewidywano dla nich kluczową rolę w ewentualnej przyszłej wojnie, na krótszą metę zaś Świętym Graalem wydawała się komunikacja lotnicza na linii Anglia–Indie. Wobec tego Tarrant nie odpuszczał. Do oblatania prototypu wyznaczono kapitanów Fredericka George’a Dunna i Percy’ego Townleya Rawlingsa. Ten drugi był zresztą w historii Tabora więcej niż tylko pilotem. Ponoć to właśnie on zainspirował Tarranta do zajęcia się produkcją bombowców. Rawlings był bowiem obserwatorem w załodze Handleya Page’a O/100, który 9 lipca 1917 roku, wystartowawszy z greckiego Mudrosu, zbombardował w Konstantynopolu turecki krążownik liniowy Yavuz Sultan Selim (dawny niemiecki SMS Goeben). Bomby nie wyrządziły okrętowi poważnych szkód, ale sam nalot wywarł potężne wrażenie – jeśli nie na Turkach, to przynajmniej na Rawlingsie.

Oprócz Dunna i Rawlingsa załogę samolotu stanowiły jeszcze cztery osoby (w tym mechanik pokładowy Adams, który również uczestniczył w locie nad Konstantynopol). Wiekopomna chwila nadeszła dopiero 26 maja 1919 roku. Przygotowania przedstartowe trwały długo, zwłaszcza że do włączenia silników na środkowym płacie trzeba było specjalnego rusztowania. Pierwsze kołowania przebiegły jednak bezproblemowo, toteż Dunn uznał, że samolot jest sprawny i może startować. Francis Mason opisuje następne sekundy i późniejsze wydarzenia tak:

Kiedy ogon podniósł się nad ziemię, [Dunn] dodał gazu w dwóch górnych silnikach i wszyscy zobaczyli, jak ogromny trójpłat pochyla się na nos. Podwozie się złamało, samolot stanął dęba i zamarł z ogonem do góry na zmiażdżonym nosie. Dunn i Rawlings zmarli niedługo potem w szpitalu.
Późniejsze dochodzenie wykazało, że bezpośrednią przyczyną wypadku było nagłe zwiększenie ciągu górnej pary silników […], co spowodowało, że samolot pochylił się na nos. Wydaje się, że gdyby piloci wiedzieli o ciężkim balaście włożonym do nosa, mieliby znacznie mniejszą ochotę na użycie tak dużej dodatkowej mocy górnych silników, zwłaszcza że ogólna masa samolotu była stosunkowo niska (bez bomb i z niewielkim zapasem paliwa).

Ten ostatni wniosek jest kluczowy dla oceny samolotu. Tarrant Tabor bez wątpienia okazał się niewypałem – wyprodukowano jeden egzemplarz, który nigdy nie wzniósł się w powietrze, niepodobna więc stanąć na stanowisku, że była to udana konstrukcja. Działający na wyobraźnię ogrom płatowca (i wysiłek włożony w jego budowę) uczynił z dzieła Tarranta i Barlinga symbol przerostu ambicji nad możliwościami technicznymi. I wszystko byłoby w porządku, gdyby nie to, że Tabor stał się w kolejnych dziesięcioleciach swoistym chłopcem do bicia. Nie jednym z wielu nieudanych samolotów, które przewinęły się w historii lotnictwa, ale wręcz najgorszym samolotem w historii, dziełem szaleńców, konstrukcją od A do Z złą. Z tym już się zgodzić nie można.

W takiej pozycji Tarrant Tabor zakończył swój pierwszy lot, zanim go rozpoczął.
(Imperial War Museum)

Tabor przede wszystkim padł ofiarą swoich zbyt słabych silników. Gdyby zgodnie z planem wyposażono go w Tigery, zachowałby pierwotny układ konstrukcyjny, z dwoma płatami i czterema silnikami na dolnym płacie. Sprawa byłaby jeszcze prostsza, gdyby zamiast Tigerów czy Lionów dostępne były Rolls-Royce’y Condory II o mocy 650 koni mechanicznych. Problemem było też umieszczenie podwozia za daleko od nosa i zbyt blisko środka ciężkości. I w tej kwestii dodatkowy balast w nosie okazał się zgubny.

W nieszczęsnym bombowcu Tarranta z pewnością krył się dobry pomysł – pomysł wymuszony realiami wojny, którego te same realia nie pozwoliły w pełni zrealizować. Wraz z katastrofą bombowca zawaliły się również plany budowy samolotu pasażerskiego, a Walter George Tarrant porzucił marzenia o budowie drugiego Tabora i w ogóle o sukcesach w przemyśle lotniczym, po czym wrócił do stawiania domów. Zmarł w 1942 roku.

O ile jednak dla Tarranta lotnictwo pozostało tylko wspomnieniem, o tyle Walter Barling dalej rozwijał karierę inżyniera za Atlantykiem, gdzie trafił dzięki słynnemu generałowi brygady Billy’emu Mitchellowi. We współpracy z przedsiębiorstwem Witteman-Lewis Barling opracował XNBL-1 (eksperymentalny nocny bombowiec dalekiego zasięgu – Experimental Night Bomber, Long Range), będący de facto ulepszoną wersją Tabora. Barling tym razem postawił na układ dwuipółpłata z sześcioma silnikami Liberty L-12 zamontowanymi na tej samej wysokości.

Witteman-Lewis XNBL-1.
(US Army)

XNBL-1 miał rozpiętość 36,5 metra i masę własną 12,3 tony – był największym samolotem zbudowanym do tamtej pory w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Oblatano go 22 października 1923 roku. Był zdecydowanie krokiem naprzód względem Tabora, ale krokiem o cztery lata spóźnionym. Pierwszy prototyp pozostał jedynym, a Witteman-Lewis wskutek przekroczenia kosztorysu niebawem zbankrutowało. Niemniej jednak doświadczenia zebrane z samolotem, który zapisał się w historii jako „Barling Bomber”, wykorzystano dziesięć lat później przy budowie pierwszych bombowców z prawdziwego zdarzenia dla United States Army Air Corps.